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1 Introduction
Land and housing assets represent a large share of the total value of assets held by households
across the world. In the United States, data from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Account
in 1990 indicate that real estate represented about one-third of household assets. In developing
countries, the corresponding numbers are often much higher at 45% of urban wealth in China,
80% of rural wealth in China, 78% of urban wealth in India and 87% of rural wealth in India.1
The importance of real estate for the economic lives of households has motivated property
rights reforms in many developing countries. Such reforms include land titling and privatization
programs aimed at encouraging households to maximize their use of land and housing assets.
Research has demonstrated that property rights affect household decision-making, includ-
ing investments (Besley 1995, Field 2005, Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010, Goldstein and Udry
2008), labor market choices (Field 2007, Wang 2012) and residential decisions (Wang 2011).
However, the economics literature on property rights has generally focused on the household as
a single agent. In reality, property rights can accrue to individuals within a household rather
than to a unitary household unit or in equal proportion to all members of a household. For
example, property titles often include only the name of the head of household (Deere and Leon
2001[a], Deere and Leon 2001[b]). In developing countries, the household head is often male;
thus, programs that transfer land titles or other forms of property rights to households with-
out careful consideration of intra-household issues may have important implications for gender
inequality within households.
This paper examines how individual-level transfers of property rights affect the distribution
of bargaining power within the household. Thus, the results contribute to a growing policy
debate on structuring property rights reforms to be cognizant of the implications for women’s
rights in developing countries. Concern for women’s rights is behind the growing interest in
1The sources of data for these estimates are the 1995 Urban and Rural Household Income Surveys of China
and the National Sample Survey Organization of India in 1991.
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mandating that the names of both the husband and wife be included on property registration
and other forms of protection of individual rights within households (Field 2003, Deere and
Leon 2001[a], Lastarria-Cornhiel 2009, Meizen et al 1997).
Descriptive evidence demonstrates a positive correlation between female ownership of land
or housing and her outcomes within the household as measured by domestic violence (Panda
and Agarwal 2005). To my knowledge, my analysis is the first to offer a rigorous empirical
method for identifying the causal impact of individual-level property rights transfers on the
bargaining outcomes of men and women within households. This question is answered in the
context of a housing reform that occurred in China that gave existing tenants the opportunity
to purchase the homes that had been tied with their employment within the state sector. Rights
to each housing unit were granted to a particular employee, so property rights were defined at
the individual level rather than the household level. Prior to the reform, people had use rights
to the housing units, but the reform gave them full ownership rights including the right to lease,
sell and collateralize the property. Using a panel data set, the empirical strategy compares the
outcomes of same households before and after the reform, as well as relative to a comparison
group of households.
In addition to the literature on the microeconomic effects of property rights, this paper
contributes to an understanding of the intra-household bargaining outcomes between men and
women.2 This literature can be broadly separated into two areas. One area considers the deter-
minants of bargaining weights within a couple focus on gender differences in income (Anderson
and Eswaran 2009, Browning et al 1994, Duflo 2003, Hoddinott and Haddad 1995, Luke and
Munshi 2011, Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997, Ponczek 2011, Thomas 1990). The other
area of this literature examines individual asset ownership rather than control over income
(Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 2002, Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002, Fafchamps and
Quisumbing 2005, Fafchamps, Kebede, and Quisumbing 2009).
2See Basu (2006), Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman 1997, Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and
Horney (1981) for the use of bargaining models of intra-household allocation.
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This paper falls into the second body of the literature on control over assets and intra-
household bargaining outcomes. The existing literature primarily focuses on how the division
of assets prior to marriage affects bargaining outcomes. However, the assets that are brought
into a union may be endogenous to the marriage outcomes being studied. To my knowledge,
this paper is the first to examine an unexpected change in the property rights over assets that
occurs after marriage.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Socialism and Early Housing Reforms
After taking control in 1949, the Communist Party of China nationalized urban land and
established a labor market system that guaranteed jobs for workers. Households that already
held private ownership rights to their homes retained full property rights over their residences,
but the government established public ownership of all new housing stock. Public housing stock
was allocated to urban residents through state work units in exchange for nominal rents. During
this period, use rights were well recognized and there was very little risk of expropriation by
other individuals or by the government (as long as the individuals did not change employers).
Reform began following the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976. The new leadership
initiated a gradual reform of the socialist system towards a mixed economy. Recognizing serious
problems in the state provision of housing, including shortages, poor management and corrup-
tion in distribution (Wang and Murie 1999), the government enacted housing reforms which
allows for private construction of housing to occur and the supply of private housing expanded.
The first experiments of reforming the public housing system in 1979 entailed the sale of newly
built apartments at construction cost in Xian and and Nanning. During the 1980s, several
other small-scale housing experiments were piloted in different cities. However, the small-scale
attempts at privatizing housing failed because people found the prices too high.
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After the political protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the central government shifted
the discussion about housing reform towards rent increases rather than privatization. The
government realized its past attempts at privatization were financially infeasible as well as po-
litically destabilizing (Davis 1993). Davis’ interviews with urban residents confirm that the
central and municipal governments hid their plans for full commodification of urban housing
from the population through the early-1990s. While the experiments of the 1980’s demonstrated
the government’s interest in housing reform, qualitative research suggests that the urban pop-
ulation did not foresee the timing and specific nature of the reform. The quantitative analyses
in Wang (2011) and Wang (2012) confirm that anticipation of the housing reform did not affect
pre-reform labor market choices.
2.2 Privatization of State-Owned Housing
In July 1994, the State Council announced the procedures for state employers to sell state-owned
housing units to existing tenants in all cities in China. Those living in state-owned housing
were given the opportunity to buy ownership rights to their current homes. Learning from the
negative public response to the small-scale housing experiments of the 1980s, the government
allowed work units to set prices for their housing stock below market value with additional
discounts based on seniority. Most buyers paid less than 15% of the market value for their
homes (China News Analysis, 1998). Analysis using data from the Chinese Household Income
Project covering urban areas in eleven provinces in 1995 indicate that the average difference
between the market value and the price charged by the government was 24,462 RMB, which is
over two times the average annual wages of a household. The direct impact of the reform was
to transfer ownership rights over housing to sitting tenants who previously only held use rights.
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2.3 Property Rights in Marriage and Divorce
According to the Marriage Law in China, property and other assets acquired during marriage
are considered jointly owned. The laws leave unclear whether use rights to housing acquired
prior to marriage but converted to full ownership rights during marriage are legally considered
to be acquired during marriage and hence joint property or acquired prior to marriage and
hence the individual property. This ambiguity suggests that one possible channel through
which individual property rights can influence bargaining outcomes is that it affects the well-
being of individuals in the case of divorce. In a rational model of Nash bargaining within
a household, an individual’s endowment of assets associated with a reform can only change
bargaining outcomes between husbands and wives if it alters their outcomes under the threat
point (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981). However, even in the complete
absence of individual rights over the property in the case of divorce, the reform may alter
outcomes between husbands and wives under a behavioral story of a kind of mental accounting
(Thaler 1992, Duflo and Udry 2004). Unfortunately, the limitations of the data, which will
be discussed in greater detail in the following section, make it impossible to disentangle the
relative contributions of these possible channels.
There is an upward trend in the rate of divorce in China over the sample period, but
overall the rates remained low and never exceeded 3% in the sample. The low rates of divorce,
however, do not imply that models of intra-household bargaining do not apply during this
period in China. What matters in these standard bargaining models is the threat of divorce;
in equilibrium, divorce rates may remain low but the threat of divorce may affect the decisions
of husbands and wives. Furthermore, alternative models propose that threat points may be
non-cooperative marriage rather than divorce (Lundberg and Pollack 1993).
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3 Data and Methodology
3.1 China Health and Nutrition Survey
I use a panel data set called the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). Nine provinces
(Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong) are
covered by the CHNS and these provinces vary considerably in their economic development and
geography. Following a multistage, random cluster design, counties were stratified into three
levels of income, and a weighted sampling technique randomly selected four counties in each
province. In addition, the data include the capital province and one low-income city. The full
data set covers approximately 4,400 households in the non-consecutive years 1989, 1991, 1993,
1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006. Thus, the data used in this analysis include three waves before and
four waves after the beginning of the housing reform in 1994.
The data set offers several measures of household bargaining outcomes between husbands
and wives.3 First, a measure of individual contributions to household public goods is reflected
by the amount of time individuals spend on household chores. The number of minutes that an
individual spends on chores includes the time spent on child care, buying food, food preparation
and clothes washing. The second measure of bargaining outcomes in the data is consumption
spending, specifically on cigarettes, tea, and alcohol.4
Table 1 presents summary statistics with data that pools together all available waves of
data for heads and spouses in the treatment and controls households. It shows that there are
substantial gender differences in time spent on chores. Men spend a little more than one hour
per day on chores, and women over three hours per day. It also demonstrates that Chinese men
smoke over 9 cigarettes per day as compared with less than 1 by Chinese women. Women in
China drink about half as much tea as men. Finally, men drink about 14 times more alcohol
3While the data also include anthropometric measurements of children, the sample sizes are quite small and
the data and results are discussed in Appendix A.
4Other commonly-used gender-specific consumption measures, such as men’s and women’s clothing, are not
included in this data set.
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than women.5 All of these differences are significant at the 5% level or higher.
There are a few important drawbacks to the data. The sample sizes vary across outcomes
because the survey questions covered varied wave to wave. While the questions on time use were
asked in all seven waves of the survey, the question on cigarette consumption is asked in 1991
on while the questions on tea and alcohol are asked from 1993 on. Furthermore, the sample
size appropriate for the analysis is relatively small, particularly for the sample of households in
which only wives are working in the state sector.
3.2 Overview of Empirical Approach
To evaluate the causal impact of the housing reform on household bargaining outcomes, I use
a differences-in-differences framework. The idea underlying the identification strategy is to
compare the outcome not only before and after the reform, but also between a treatment group
and a control group. After the central announcement of the policy change occurred in July
1994, the start of the implementation of the housing reform varied at the regional level. I am
unable to exploit this variation because the data set used in this analysis is not collected in
the years between 1993 and 1997, and all areas in the data set had implemented the reform by
1997.6
The analysis uses an intention-to-treat approach to identify which households received
ownership rights. The two treatment groups in the analysis are households that are living in
state-owned housing prior to the reform but only one member of the couple (either the husband
or the wife) is working in the state sector. There are two comparison groups in the analysis,
comprised of households that are not living in state-owned housing where either the male or
female head or the spouse of the head is employed in the state sector. The individuals in the
comparison groups should not experience a direct effect of the reform of state-owned housing
but should absorb other changes occurring in the state sector around the time of the housing
5Alcohol is in units of alcohol proof per week and is a combination of wine, liquor and beer.
6See Wang (2012) for details.
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reform. Thus, these control groups remove the effect of changes in the wage structure, increases
in lay-offs in the public sector, or decreases in provision of other in-kind benefits.
I first combine each treatment group and comparison group by gender. One set of analyses
includes the female treatment group (Propertyf = 1) and the female control group of households
not living in state-owned housing where only the wives are working in state sector (Propertyf =
0). In other words, within a sample of households where the wives are the only ones working in
the state sector, the impact of the housing reform is measured by comparing households living
in state-owned housing and households living in private housing prior to the transfer of property
rights. The second separate set of analyses includes the male treatment group (Propertym = 1)
and households not living in state-owned housing where only the husbands are working in the
state sector (Propertym = 0). This pairing of the treatment and comparison groups addresses
the concern that households where only wives work in the state sector are different along
observable and unobservable dimensions from households in which only husbands work in the
state sector or households or households in which both husbands and wives work in the same
sector. The key comparisons are between households where the same household member is
working in the state sector. These estimates are interesting for policy and provide a useful
benchmark for many other papers in the literature that present the estimates separately by
gender.
In addition, I examine whether the treatment effect given by the difference-in-difference
varies by gender. This is the key test of the unitary household model. Using this comparison
between the male and female samples to test the unitary household model relies on the idea that
the magnitude of the asset transfer was similar in the male sample and the female sample.7
Appendix Table 1 shows pre-reform characteristics of the state-owned housing units for the
male treatment sample and the female treatment sample. The overall pre-reform market value
of state-owned housing units is not statistically different for households in which men hold the
7Note that the separated within gender estimates of the program do not rely on this assumption.
9
housing rights as compared with households in which women hold the rights. However, the
magnitude of the gap is not small at 18.8% and some of the characteristics of the homes are
significantly different.
3.3 Construction of Treatment and Comparison Groups
While the rights to each housing unit were assigned to a particular person, the data set does not
explicitly ask which household member held these rights. I separate the male treatment group
(Propertym = 1) from the female treatment group (Propertyf = 1) by identifying households
living in state-owned housing with only the head or the spouse of the head employed in the
state sector in 1989 (or the next pre-reform wave for which data is available).8 In the majority
of state-owned housing units, both the head and the spouse are employed in the state sector.
Because it is not possible to identify which individual held the rights to the property in the
CHNS, households in which both the husband and wife are working in the state sector are
excluded from the analysis. Households in which both the husband and the wife are working in
the private sector are also excluded. Thus, the identification strategy employed in this paper
does not make use of about 70% of households in the total sample.
Similarly, the comparison group is defined by households not living in state-owned housing
but with one member of the couple working in the state sector in 1989 (or the next pre-
reform wave for which data are available). For comparability with the treatment groups, these
comparison groups exclude households in which both the husband and wife or neither the
husband and wife are employed in the state sector.
8In other words, the cases where the data are missing for 1989, treatment status is defined with the next
earliest pre-reform wave (1991 or 1993) for which data are available.
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3.4 Validity of Assignment of Treatment Status
The 1995 wave of the China Household Income Project (CHIP) asks the identity of the specific
individual in the household that holds the property rights to the state-owned housing.9 I use
the CHIP data to evaluate whether the methodology that I propose for the CHNS accurately
identifies the holder of the property rights. I construct the analogous male and female treatment
groups using questions on employment and housing status for households in which only one
member of the married couple is working in the state sector in the CHIP. Comparing these
constructed measures with the identities of the individuals holding property rights based on
the direct CHIP survey question, the constructions are accurate for 90% of CHIP households.
The small amount of measurement error in the construction of the treatment groups in the
CHNS should lead to a downward bias in the results.
3.5 Validity of Empirical Approach
Table 2 presents pre-reform characteristics of the households in the four groups. The first two
columns refer to the households in which only the husband is employed in the state sector,
and the last two to households in which only the wife is employed in the state sector. Among
households with women employed in the state sector, the characteristics of those living in state-
owned housing are generally not statistically different from those living in private housing.
Female treatment households have on average a slightly smaller household size and an older
head of household. There are similar differences in household size and age of the head of
household for the male sample. Furthermore, in the male sample, the differences in the intra-
household bargaining outcomes are statistically significant for several measures. Regardless of
the gender of the individual employed in the state sector, households living in private housing
tend to consume more cigarettes, tea and alcohol.
A potential concern is that differences in observable characteristics may suggest the pres-
9I am unable to use the CHIP for the analysis in this paper because it only offers cross-sectional information.
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ence of differences in unobservable characteristics. The panel structure of the data allows me to
remove the effects of any unobservable factors that are time invariant through the inclusion of
household fixed effects. However, the fixed effects approach cannot address time-varying effects
of unobservable factors. The comparison of the results for the male sample and the female
sample can be helpful in this regard. Given that observable differences between the treatment
group and the comparison group are similar for men as for women, it may be reasonable to infer
that unobservable differences between the treatment and comparison groups are also similar
across gender. If unobservable differences in the treatment and comparison groups are driving
the results, then we would expect the impact of the reform to have effects on the measures of
bargaining outcomes that have the same sign for men and women. In contrast, if the improve-
ment in property rights is driving the estimated post-reform differences between the treatment
and control groups, then we would expect opposite sign effects for men and women.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the identification strategy does not require
the characteristics of the treatment and the comparison groups to be identical. Rather, the
identification strategy requires that the trends in the outcomes of the treatment group moves
in parallel with the comparison group prior to the reform. Figure 1 presents the trends over
time for three of the bargaining outcomes available in the data.10 The data offer three pre-
reform waves of data for the share of time spent on chores that is born by wives (row 1).
There are two pre-reforms waves of data for household cigarette consumption (row 2). The first
column presents the trends for the treatment and comparison group in the sample of households
where only the husband is employed in the state sector. The second column presents the same
information for the sample of households in which only the wife is state employed. The evidence
supports the idea that the trends in the outcomes for the treatment and comparison groups
were generally moving in parallel prior to the housing reform.11
10The figure omits two bargaining outcomes. It is not possible to examine pre-reform time trends in alcohol
consumption and tea consumption because the questions are added to the survey in 1993.
11The corresponding regression estimates demonstrate that none of the differences in pre-reform outcomes
are significantly different. These results are available upon request.
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4 Property Rights and Bargaining Outcomes
To implement the estimation strategy described in the previous section, I estimate the following
fixed effects equation:
yit = α1Property
g
i ∗ Postt + δt + α4xit + γi + εit (1)
where i denotes household and t year. Propertyg identifies the treatment group where g = f
refers to the female sample and g = m the male sample. Postt is a dummy variable that
equals 1 in the periods following the reform, and γi are household fixed effects. The vector of
covariates, xit, is a quadratic in the age of the household head, the logarithm of household size
and an indicator variable for the gender of the head. I also estimate whether the treatment
effect given by the difference-in-difference estimated described in equation 1 varies by gender.
The dependent variables are the share of household chores done by women, the logarithm
of the one plus number of cigarette consumed per day by the household, the logarithm of one
plus the number of cups consumed per day by the household, and the logarithm of one plus
the amount of alcohol consumed by the household in a week. In addition, to make general
conclusions about the impact of the reform on bargaining power within the household that
address the issue of multiple inference, I also present a summary index as a dependent variable.
This is an equal average of each of the z-scores of the four variables.12
The main results are presented in Table 3. Panel A of Table 3 displays the impact of
transferring property rights to men. Increasing property rights to men increases women’s share
of total time spent on household chores by five percentage points. This effect is statistically
significant at the 10% level. In terms of consumption of male-favored goods, the results indicate
that increasing property rights held by men leads to an increase in household consumption of
tea and cigarettes, but only the results for tea are significantly different from zero at the 5%
12I present the separate outcomes in addition the summary index because the magnitudes of the coefficients
on the separate outcomes are easier to interpret.
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level. The majority of the results provide evidence suggesting that a transfer of property rights
to men increased their subsequent bargaining power in the household. The exception is the
results on alcohol, where consumption by households where men received the ownership rights
to state-owned housing falls by ten percent relative to households in which men did not receive
improvements to their property rights. However, this result is not statistically significant. The
impact on the summary index of the four measures is positive and significant at the 5% level.
The corresponding results for women are in Panel B. Given that the sample size is much
smaller, it is not surprising that the results are statistically much weaker than the results for
men. The impact of transferring property rights to women on the index of the four measures
is negative but not significant at the standard levels. The impact on the summary index is
not significant at the standard levels. The only single measure for which there is a statistically
significant impact at the 5% level is household cigarette consumption. The results indicate that
transferring ownership rights to women leads to a large 59% drop in the household consumption
of cigarettes. In addition, transferring ownership rights to women corresponds with a 0.9
standard deviation increase in the weight-for-age of girls in the household (see Appendix A).
The magnitudes of these effects are quite large. However, this may not be surprising given
that the average value of the housing transfer was over two times the income of an average
household. The direction of the estimates also indicates that strengthening property rights
held by women leads to slight decreases in women’s share of household chores, and declines in
the consumption of tea and alcohol. However, the results are not very conclusive given the lack
of power in the estimates.
Panel C presents the p-value of the test of whether the coefficient on the difference-in-
difference estimate in the sample of households where men are state employed is significantly
different from the estimate in the sample of households where women are state employed. Based
on the summary index, the impact of the reform varies significantly (at the 10% level) by the
gender of the recipient. This seems primarily driven by the significant gender gap in the impact
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of the reform on cigarette consumption.
The differences in the direction of the effects of ownership rights for households in which
women receive the rights (Panel B) and households in which men receive the rights (Panel A) are
interesting for several reasons. First, they support the conclusion that the estimated changes in
the female share of chores and in consumption of male-favored goods is not driven by a general
household-level wealth effect or by general household changes in specialization associated with
the transition from renting to owning. If the results were driven by household -level changes
rather than by shifts in intra-household bargaining, then we would expect the results to be the
same sign regardless of the gender of the recipient of property rights. Second, the differences
in the results for women and for men suggest that the results are not driven by time-varying
effects of unobservable differences between the treatment and comparison groups.
The results indicate an interesting possible asymmetry in the uses of increased intra-
household bargaining power of women and men. Strengthening women’s property rights does
seem to increase women’s bargaining power, and on average women use this power to decrease
their husbands’ consumption of cigarettes. Men’s bargaining power within the household is
also improved when property rights are transferred to them, and they choose to leverage their
additional power to drink more tea and do fewer chores.
5 Robustness Checks
Table 2 indicated some significant differences in the characteristics of households in the treat-
ment and the comparison groups. In this section, I examine the possibility that the results may
be explained by time-varying effects of the observable characteristics along which the treatment
and comparison households are different. For example, in the samples in which only wives are
employed in the state sector, the age of the head of household is about seven years older in
the treatment group than in the comparison group. The same age gap in the sample in which
only husbands are employed in the state sector is only two years. There may be age differences
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over age in preferences for consumption of tea and cigarettes. Furthermore, gaps in the level of
health of men and women as they age may explain shifts in the gender division of chores.
I deal with this concern by including the interaction of the post-reform indicator and age,
household size and gender of the household head in the regressions. The results are shown in
Table 4. The magnitude and the significance of the estimates are quite similar after allowing for
time-varying effects of the observable characteristics. The exception is the impact of transferring
property rights women on households’ consumption of alcohol where the results actually become
stronger (Panel B). This estimate becomes significant at the 10% level, and indicates that
transferring property rights over housing to women decreases the household’s consumption of
alcohol by over 40%. This is consistent with the interpretation that transferring property rights
to women increases her relative bargaining power and leads to decreases in the consumption
of male-favored goods. While the impact on alcohol of transferring property rights to women
is not significantly different than transferring rights to men (Panel C), the magnitude of the
overall difference given by the summary measure is much larger.
6 Alternative Mechanisms
While the gender differences in the results suggest that the mechanism must be occurring at
the individual-level, this section considers whether the results are consistent with alternative,
individual-level changes associated with housing reform. Wang (2012) shows that the housing
reform in China affects individuals’ probability of moving from the state sector to the private
sector.13 Prior to the reform, subsidized state-owned housing was tied to an individual’s state
employer. The reform may have allowed individuals with housing rights to move into jobs with
higher wages relative to their spouses. Thus, the main effect of the housing reform may operate
through changes in the household composition of wages.
I consider the possibility of a wage-based mechanism by examining the impact of the
13The impact of the reform on job choices did not vary significantly by gender.
16
gender of the transfer of housing rights on the female share of household earnings. The results
are presented in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5. In the sample of households in which only
husbands are employed in the state sector, the impact of receiving ownership rights leads to a
2.5 percentage point decline in the wife’s share of household income but this is not statistically
different from zero. In the sample of households in which only wives are employed in the state
sector, the impact of receiving ownership rights translates into an 8.8 percentage point decline
in the wife’s share of household income. These estimates are not statistically significant at the
standard levels, and Panel B shows that the difference between the male and female samples
is not significant either. Furthermore, the sign of the impact is the opposite of what we would
expect if the gender composition of earnings explained the results on bargaining outcomes.
I also examine the hypothesis that household bargaining outcomes changed as a result
of changes in the composition of the household. This could be driven by mobility of some
individuals out of the household following the housing reform. Previous research has shown
that the reform did lead to an increase in household-level residential mobility (Wang 2012).
Finally, I examine the impact of the reform on household size in the male sample and in the
female sample in columns 2 and 4, respectively. The dependent variable in columns 3 and
4 is the share of the household that is male. For both variables, the sign of the impact of
receiving ownership rights is the same for the male sample and the female sample, and neither
is statistically different from zero. Panel B shows that they are not different from each other
either. Overall, the results do not support the alternative mechanisms for explaining the results
on household consumption of male-favored goods and on the division of household chores.
7 Conclusion
The results of the paper provide some evidence to support the idea that strengthening property
rights for individuals also affects their bargaining power within the household. In the context of
China, strengthening property rights over housing by granting rights to sell, lease and mortgage
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led to different outcomes based on who received the benefit. When women received ownership
rights, there were very large decreases in household consumption of cigarettes and alcohol, which
are male-favored goods, and improvements in girls’ weight-for-age. Giving the same rights to
men led to increases in household consumption of a male-favored good, tea, and decreases in
the men’s contributions to household chores. The large magnitude of the results in this paper
may not be that surprising given that the value of the asset transfer was extremely large, at
over twice an average household’s annual income.
The findings in this paper are consistent with previous findings that reject the model of
a unitary household. One contribution of this paper is to offer rigorous empirical evidence
highlighting the importance of individual control over assets. Housing assets may be unique
from other assets in that people reside on the property in addition to begin about to access the
value in a variety of ways. It is a question for future research whether the impact would be
similar if a program were to transfer non-housing assets.
The findings of the paper are the most relevant for other countries, particularly in Asia
and sub-Saharan Africa, where state-owned housing assets represent a substantial share of the
housing stock. However, they are also potentially relevant for titling programs that convert
use rights into formal ownership rights. The results highlight the potential importance of the
individual that receives the ownership rights for bargaining outcomes within the household.
A Anthropometric Measurements of Children
Improvements in the earnings of women relative to men have been shown to lead to improve-
ments in the children’s outcomes. Duflo (2003) finds that pensions received by South African
women increased the anthropometric outcomes of girls only while those received by men had
no effect on either girls or boys. Thomas (1990) shows that increases in unearned income by
mothers have larger effects on child health than the same income attributable to fathers.
I look at anthropometric measurements of children to examine gender differences in in-
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vestments in children in the household. I construct weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores
for boys and and girls aged 18 and under in the households. I also combine both weight-for-age
and height-for-age z-scores into a single measure of health for boys and girls. The nutrition
literature considers children’s height to be a long-run measure of nutrition and health inputs
while weight is a short-run indicator. The z-score calculation uses U.S. Center for Disease Con-
trol Growth Reference charts from 2000. While these data are available for every wave of the
survey, the sample sizes are quite small as the weight-for-age z-scores for girls (boys) are only
available for households with at least one girl (boy). Furthermore, the limitations of the data
do not allow me to only examine outcomes for children under the age of 60 months, as there
would be no variation in the interaction of treatment status and post-reform in the sample of
households in which only women are employed in the state sector.
The results are presented in Appendix Table 2. Panel A shows that transferring ownership
rights to men does in translate into significant changes in the height or weight of children in the
household or to the index measure. In contrast, transferring property rights to women leads
to almost a standard deviation increase in the weight-for-age of girls but no corresponding
significant impact for boys. The estimates using the index that combines the measures of
height and weight tell a similar story. The impact of transferring property rights to women
leads to 0.7 of a standard deviation increase in the index of health of girls and this is significant
at the 10% level. The gender differences in the results for weight-for-age are very similar to
those found by Duflo (2003). Unlike the findings of previous studies on income transfers, the
transfer of property rights does not lead to significant changes height-for-age. This may be
because rights over asset ownership do not have long-run effects whereas control over income
does, or it may be because of the low power offered by the sample including anthropometric
measures of children.
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Figure 1: Trends in Bargaining Outcomes
(a) Male Sample (c) Female Sample
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Table 1: Individual Time Use and Consumption by Gender
Men Women
Time on Household Chores (minutes/day) 66.36 208.31
(223.97)* (333.45)
N=2630 N=2631
Number of Cigarettes per Day 9.79 0.56
(10.88)* (2.81)
N=1773 N=1932
Cups of Tea per Day 2.38 1.15
(2.73)* (1.95)
N=1274 N=1398
Alcohol Consumption per Week 2.44 0.17
(4.56)* (0.99)
N=1319 N=1420
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. N displays the number of obser-
vations. * denotes that the male average is significantly different from the
female average at the 5% level.
24
Table 2: Pre-Reform Household Characteristics by Gender and Residence of the State Employee
Male State Employed Female State Employed
Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison
Monthly Household Earnings 232.28 227.36 243.52 275.48
(174.83) (170.77) (150.12) (201.03)
N=473 N=768 N=140 N=111
Household Size 3.52 4.09 3.51 4.02
(1.39)* (1.47) (1.39)* (1.52)
N=586 N=961 N=164 N=131
Age of Head 51.09 49.31 55.92 48.46
(14.14)* (13.02) (14.96)* (14.43)
N=582 N=955 N=164 N=128
Education of Head 7.02 6.34 5.40 5.57
(4.86)* (4.20) (4.65) (4.03)
N=545 N=928 N=155 N=128
Female Share of Chores 0.73 0.83 0.82 0.78
(0.34)* (0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
N=564 N=918 N=159 N=128
Cigarette Consumption 9.98 12.73 7.70 9.50
(12.18)* (13.79) (9.92) (10.71)
N=354 N=611 N=101 N=84
Tea Consumption 3.64 4.95 3.80 3.97
(4.18)* (5.98) (4.70) (4.63)
N=165 N=291 N=44 N=38
Alcohol Consumption 1.96 2.73 0.91 2.03
(3.18) (5.30) (1.72) (3.21)
N=165 N=293 N=43 N=39
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. N displays the number of observations. * denotes
that the comparison group is significantly different from the treatment group at the 5% level.
The consumption measures are at the household level.
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Table 3: Effects of Transferring Property Rights on the Division of Chores and Consumption
Female Share Log Cigarette Log Tea Log Alcohol Summary
of Chores Consumption Consumption Consumption Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Male State Employed Sample
Propertym*Post 0.049+ 0.050 0.200* -0.123 0.159*
[0.029] [0.135] [0.100] [0.095] [0.066]
Year1989 -0.001 0.094
[0.033] [0.075]
Year1991 -0.007 0.378** 0.136*
[0.032] [0.139] [0.063]
Year1993 0.017 0.237+ 0.397** 0.212* 0.233**
[0.031] [0.130] [0.086] [0.085] [0.057]
Year1997 -0.020 0.308** 0.202** 0.242** 0.153**
[0.029] [0.106] [0.078] [0.076] [0.048]
Year2000 -0.059* 0.129 0.225** 0.310** 0.097*
[0.026] [0.100] [0.069] [0.071] [0.046]
Year2004 -0.049* 0.032 0.016 0.123* -0.007
[0.025] [0.086] [0.068] [0.062] [0.037]
Observations 2495 2135 1597 1626 2696
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.065 0.077 0.044 0.045
Panel B: Female State Employed Sample
Propertyf*Post -0.000 -0.589* -0.033 -0.315 -0.188
[0.060] [0.228] [0.229] [0.261] [0.144]
Year1989 -0.009 0.027
[0.078] [0.173]
Year1991 -0.001 -0.057 -0.002
[0.075] [0.282] [0.139]
Year1993 0.030 -0.072 0.277 0.150 0.065
[0.070] [0.274] [0.241] [0.278] [0.139]
Year1997 -0.017 0.238 0.147 0.434** 0.110
[0.065] [0.230] [0.201] [0.157] [0.101]
Year2000 0.017 -0.059 -0.073 0.210 0.014
[0.056] [0.231] [0.176] [0.134] [0.098]
Year2004 -0.006 0.055 -0.016 0.214 -0.006
[0.062] [0.195] [0.156] [0.163] [0.099]
Observations 438 362 255 259 471
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.143 0.055 0.059 0.092
Panel C: Comparing Male and Female Estimates
p-value 0.990 0.074+ 0.642 0.739 0.052+
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. **, *, + denotes significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Regressions include a quadratic in the age of the
head, the logarithm of household size, an indicator for the gender of the head, a constant term
and household fixed effects.
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Table 4: Impact of Property Rights Allowing for Time-Varying Effects of Observables
Female Share Log Cigarette Log Tea Log Alcohol Summary
of Chores Consumed Consumed Consumed Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Male State Employed Sample
Propertym*Post 0.051+ 0.091 0.179+ -0.108 0.158*
[0.030] [0.141] [0.101] [0.099] [0.069]
Year1989 -0.095 0.073
[0.097] [0.194]
Year1991 -0.100 -0.613 0.114
[0.097] [0.417] [0.191]
Year1993 -0.075 -0.756+ -0.749* -0.382 0.208
[0.097] [0.416] [0.307] [0.280] [0.192]
Year1997 -0.023 0.276* 0.199* 0.241** 0.149**
[0.030] [0.109] [0.081] [0.077] [0.050]
Year2000 -0.061* 0.102 0.222** 0.308** 0.093*
[0.027] [0.103] [0.072] [0.072] [0.047]
Year2004 -0.050* 0.023 0.016 0.124* -0.005
[0.025] [0.088] [0.069] [0.063] [0.038]
Observations 2495 2135 1597 1626 2696
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.065 0.076 0.043 0.042
Panel B: Female State Employed Sample
Propertyf*Post -0.008 -0.691** -0.205 -0.433+ -0.185
[0.064] [0.247] [0.229] [0.256] [0.163]
Year1989 0.109 -0.014
[0.177] [0.399]
Year1991 0.119 -0.504 -0.039
[0.176] [0.828] [0.378]
Year1993 0.155 -0.502 -0.122 -0.189 0.043
[0.176] [0.835] [0.680] [0.779] [0.383]
Year1997 -0.004 0.220 0.125 0.425** 0.144
[0.066] [0.236] [0.206] [0.152] [0.099]
Year2000 0.026 -0.061 -0.081 0.207 0.034
[0.057] [0.233] [0.184] [0.133] [0.101]
Year2004 -0.005 0.047 -0.009 0.201 0.013
[0.061] [0.194] [0.160] [0.161] [0.099]
Observations 438 362 255 259 471
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.145 0.033 0.072 0.078
Panel C: Comparing Male and Female Estimates
p-value 0.916 0.049* 0.492 0.711 0.097+
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. **, *, + denotes significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Regressions include a quadratic in the age of the
head, the logarithm of household size, an indicator for the gender of the head, post times the
previous three variables, a constant term and household fixed effects.
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Table 5: Effects of Property Rights Program on Division of Income and Household Composition
Male State Employed (g=m) Female State Employed (g=f)
Female Log Male Female Log Male
Share of Household Share of Share of Household Share of
Earnings Size Household Earnings Size Household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Estimates in the Male and Female Samples
Propertyg*Post -0.025 -0.018 -0.013 -0.088 -0.081 -0.021
[0.040] [0.037] [0.016] [0.111] [0.104] [0.041]
Year1989 -0.052 0.345** 0.025 0.176 0.419** 0.092*
[0.049] [0.040] [0.016] [0.157] [0.102] [0.037]
Year1991 -0.043 0.272** 0.024 0.125 0.392** 0.094*
[0.046] [0.039] [0.015] [0.150] [0.097] [0.036]
Year1993 -0.035 0.223** 0.028+ 0.139 0.307** 0.081*
[0.046] [0.038] [0.015] [0.142] [0.093] [0.034]
Year1997 -0.020 0.093** 0.025+ 0.049 0.163* 0.010
[0.040] [0.035] [0.013] [0.114] [0.077] [0.036]
Year2000 -0.021 0.072* 0.032** 0.060 0.085 0.031
[0.038] [0.031] [0.011] [0.102] [0.068] [0.028]
Year2004 -0.039 0.012 0.022* -0.149 0.008 0.056*
[0.043] [0.027] [0.010] [0.102] [0.074] [0.024]
Observations 1513 2720 2720 252 474 474
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.183 0.064 0.136 0.247 0.221
Panel B: Comparing Male and Female Estimates
p-value 0.442 0.288 0.440
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. **, *, + denotes signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Regressions also include a quadratic in the
age of the head of household, an indicator for the gender of the household head, a constant
term and household fixed effects.
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Appendix Table 1: Pre-Reform Characteristics of State-Owned Housing
Male Sample Female Sample
Market Rental Value 63.1 53.1
(67.0) (53.4)
Floor Space 45.4 37.5
(39.9) (18.9)
Drinking water 0.65* 0.76
(0.48) (0.43)
Flushing toilet 0.27* 0.40
(0.44) (0.49)
No excreta around dwelling 0.82* 0.96
(0.39) (0.20)
Water source from plant 0.66* 0.87
(0.47) (0.34)
Age under 20 years 0.81 0.81
(0.39) (0.39)
Observations 379 102
Standard deviations in parentheses. * denotes that the female treatment
group is significantly different from the male treatment group at the 5%
level.
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Appendix Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimates of Property Rights and Anthropometric Measures
Weight-for-Age Height-for-Age Health Index
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Male State Employed Sample
Propertym*Post 0.164 -0.003 0.205 -0.078 0.235 -0.049
[0.261] [0.176] [0.253] [0.195] [0.242] [0.155]
Year1989 0.512 0.226 0.083 0.096 0.574 0.268
[0.356] [0.201] [0.380] [0.270] [0.363] [0.187]
Year1991 0.082 -0.045 -0.198 -0.073 0.171 -0.059
[0.329] [0.174] [0.371] [0.246] [0.334] [0.163]
Year1993 0.224 0.071 -0.189 0.009 0.241 0.054
[0.324] [0.172] [0.354] [0.236] [0.322] [0.161]
Year1997 0.133 0.157 -0.522 0.132 0.012 0.180
[0.315] [0.172] [0.341] [0.200] [0.312] [0.157]
Year2000 -0.037 0.012 -0.388 0.129 -0.016 0.084
[0.307] [0.166] [0.330] [0.197] [0.301] [0.160]
Year2004 0.214 -0.024 -0.516 -0.410* -0.028 -0.214
[0.251] [0.147] [0.326] [0.180] [0.265] [0.144]
Observations 528 613 504 581 528 616
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.039 0.044 0.045 0.039 0.064
Panel B: Female State Employed Sample
Propertyf*Post 0.939** 0.020 0.374 -0.287 0.717+ -0.021
[0.295] [0.359] [0.469] [0.263] [0.385] [0.265]
Year1989 0.261 -0.863 2.066** -0.119 1.012* -0.306
[0.878] [0.644] [0.432] [0.454] [0.485] [0.418]
Year1991 0.341 -0.834 1.850** -0.436 1.121* -0.366
[0.861] [0.559] [0.321] [0.462] [0.449] [0.443]
Year1993 0.442 -0.399 1.587** -0.071 1.038* -0.035
[0.874] [0.528] [0.316] [0.440] [0.456] [0.412]
Year1997 -0.074 -1.079+ 0.982** -0.375 0.617 -0.651
[0.751] [0.542] [0.323] [0.391] [0.372] [0.409]
Year2000 0.095 -0.516 0.567+ -0.230 0.419 -0.297
[0.589] [0.500] [0.300] [0.388] [0.254] [0.374]
Year2004 -0.328 -0.895 1.105** -0.376 0.438 -0.512
[1.409] [0.658] [0.257] [0.400] [0.664] [0.368]
Observations 97 121 95 113 97 121
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.095 0.160 0.106 0.190 0.089
Panel C: Comparing Male and Female Estimates
p-value 0.031* 0.761 0.604 0.352 0.121 0.872
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. **, *, + denotes signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Regressions also include a quadratic in the
age of the head of household, an indicator for the gender of the household head, a constant
term and household fixed effects.
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